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ABSTRACT
Existing Building Automation Systems (BASs) and Building Automation Networks (BANs)
have been shown to have serious cybersecurity problems. Due to the safety-critical and inter-
connected nature of building subsystems, local and network access control needs to be finer grained,
taking into consideration the varying criticality of applications running on heterogeneous devices.
In this paper, we present a secure communication framework for BASs that 1) enforces rich access
control policy for operating system services and objects, leveraging a microkernel-based architec-
ture; 2) supports fine-grained network access control on a per-process basis; 3) unifies the security
control of inter-device and intra-device communication using proxy processes; 4) tunnels legacy in-
secure communication protocols (e.g., BACnet) through a secure channel, such as SSL, in a manner
transparent to legacy applications. We implemented the framework on seL4, a formally verified
microkernel. We conducted extensive experiments and analysis to compare the performance and
effectiveness of our communication systems against a traditional Linux-based implementation of the
same control scenario. Our experiments show that the communication performance of our system
is faster or comparable to the Linux-based architecture in embedded systems.
v
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
With the rapid commercial expansion of Internet of Things (IoT) technology, developers and
researchers have been exploring new ways of automating our everyday environments. Commercial
buildings are undergoing a transformation to better serve customers and occupants through ad-
vanced automation and networking. These advances have made life easier for occupants and helped
developers find new ways to reduce energy consumption. However, increasing concerns, due to in-
secure IoT and cyber-physical systems (CPS) design, have hindered the growth of this technology
in recent years. Those concerns are not unfounded as application development usually focuses on
functionality and often overlooks security issues. Furthermore, as the industry is embracing the
“Smart Buildings” direction, building systems are being integrated with enterprise networks and
third-party services, resulting in a dramatic increase in security risks.
1.1 Motivation
Recent high-profile attacks and penetration tests have demonstrated the possible threats and
impacts of cyberattacks in building environments. For example, in 2013, researchers infiltrated
Google’s Australia office through their building automation network [1]. Such attacks not only can
help attackers gain control of BAS, but might also provide a stepping stone for further infiltration.
In a recent penetration test the IBM X-Force Ethical Hacking Team demonstrated a number of
vulnerabilities and security malpractices that allowed them to take full control of the network [2].
Hacking into these system has also been shown to be trivial. For example, in winter 2016, a rookie
hacker launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against an HVAC system which
resulted in the loss of heating for two buildings in Finland [3].
For distributed building systems to guarantee safety and security, secure communication can-
not be an afterthought. Building Automation Networks (BANs) must be designed in a holistic
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way that provides confidentiality, integrity, and availability for each controller across the BAN.
Moreover, due to the inter-connected nature of modern BASs and the mixed-criticality of processes
running on the controllers, it is not sufficient to solely rely upon traditional IT network perime-
ter controls, such as firewalls, to protect the critical tasks on controllers. We must assume that
neighboring controllers—even neighboring processes on the same controller—can become malicious.
Thus, communication control must be exerted on a per-process basis, as opposed to per-network
segment or per-device basis.
Within a building network, the various computers, embedded systems, and building con-
trollers are themselves potentially vulnerable to attacks. Modern buildings heavily depend on
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) for monitoring and controlling building facilities. A PLC
is an embedded real-time computer that connects with various sensors and actuators; it can be
remotely monitored and programmed through the BAN. Prior to the discovery of Stuxnet attack
in June 2010 [4], the security of PLCs received little attention. In 2012, ICS-CERT issued an alert
that documented various PLC vulnerabilities, including the possibility of uploading unauthenti-
cated configuration changes to the PLC with arbitrary code [5]. Recent work clearly demonstrated
that the technique required to attack a PLC is no more difficult than attacking any other com-
puter [6]. Since then, numerous security researchers have pointed out the abysmal lack of general
security practices for this category of devices [7, 8, 9, 10, 5]. Both in design and in deployment
a host of issues have been found from unauthenticated Telnet services to hard coded passwords,
among other things.
For both the network and the building controllers we observe a common lack of strong authen-
tication and access control mechanisms in use. Based on this observation, we propose a solution.
1.2 Contribution
The purpose of this thesis is to help mitigate the lack of strong authentication and access
control useage for building systems. To do this, I worked to fulfill the research vision of my
collaborators at the University of South Florida, Kansas State University, and Honeywell [11]. Our
proposed solution spurs from this vision.
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In an effort to provide a solution for communication security issues, we propose an applica-
tion communication framework for building automation systems. This communication framework
applies the proxy design pattern [12] and model-driven development [13], so that access control
for both inter-process communication and inter-device communication can be unified in the same
framework. This yields a solution for system architects to specify, and for microkernels to enforce,
fine-grained security policy encompassing both network and inter-process communications.
To provide information security for inter-device communication, we use standard tunneling
techniques in combination with the proxy-based architecture, so that standard, insecure building
automation protocols, such as BACnet, can be tunneled inside a secure channel like SSL. We believe
that this design will eliminate many existing BAS security and privacy issues by guaranteeing that
all communication follows predefined patterns, even in the case of partial system compromise, and
that messages exchanged between controllers have strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees.
Our specific contributions are:
• A specification of our communication framework design (section 4).
• An implementation of our design on seL4 for an ARM-based platform (section 5).
• Experimental performance results of our design compared to traditional implementations,
using workloads derived from live building network data (section 6).
• An evaluation of the security properties of our design when compared with traditional ap-
proaches (i.e., based on Linux) using a case study (section 6).
Some materials presented in this thesis were published in Second Workshop on Communica-
tion, Computing, and Networking in Cyber Physical Systems (CCNCPS) in 2017 [14].
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
1 Building Automation Systems (BASs) are large-scale distributed control systems that aim
to improve autonomous control and the customized management of building environments. A
typical BAS controls every aspect of a building’s operation including lighting, heating, HVAC, fire
safety, access control, video surveillance (CCTV), and more. The goal of BAS is to automatically
provide safety and comfort to occupants while reducing energy consumption and operation costs.
As a result of the rising demand for more precise and intelligent control, buildings have tighter
integration among different subsystems and external CPS, such as the power grid. Thus, a modern
BAS involves a vast amount of communication among all kinds of field devices and controllers
through a layered industrial control network called a Building Automation Network (BAN).
In this paper, we will use the term BAS to refer to singular automation building subsystem,
service, or devices. We will use BAN to refer to the networking mediums and protocols which
interconnect devices and subsystems.
2.1 Building Network Architecture
BANs are the backbone of Building Automation Systems. A standard enterprise BAN can
be generally divided into three hierarchical layers as seen in Figure 2.1. At the bottom is the field
level, where small embedded devices measure and control the physical environment. The field level
typically consists of networked sensors (e.g., motion or temperature sensors) and actuators (e.g.,
fan, locks, cooling coils). Devices communicate with each other through wired or wireless signals
using protocols, such as LonWorks [15], KNX [16], etc.
The middle layer is where automation control is performed. Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs), data acquisition units, and supervisory controllers live in this level and conduct distributed
1Some material in this section is based on previously published work from Habeeb et al. [14]. See the appendix
for the copyright information.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the layered BAN architecture.
control tasks through network protocols, such as BACnet [17] and Modbus [18]. The automation
layer often performs the task of routing BACnet/IP or KNX/IP to a small network of field devices.
These two protocols are essentially older building network protocols wrapped in a UDP frame.
Hence, devices in this layer are either called routers or controllers.
Monitoring and configuration tasks are realized at the management level. This level is where
facility management systems, energy management systems, and cloud-based third parties integrate
together. These systems typically use traditional IP networks to communicate with the automation
layer devices.
Through the BAN, devices meticulously coordinate together to perform daily operations of
the facility. Buildings come in a variety of sizes and functions; hence the control components in
BASs are highly heterogeneous and often come from various vendors with proprietary communica-
tion solutions (e.g., Johnson Controls N2, Siemens Building Technologies). Those communication
solutions often lack security for communication [19]. Also, due to their long life cycles, BASs often
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consist of numerous legacy subsystems. This diverse range of communication mediums and devices
presents a complex challenge to system-wide security.
2.2 Building Controllers
The devices and controllers that make up building automation networks are highly diverse
and run a variety of different operating systems and applications. In particular, the mid-level
automation and control devices on the network are undergoing a transformation as ARM-based
chip technology has evolved. This category of devices are generally known as “controllers” in
the industry. Controllers typically manage a sub-network of field devices, including sensors and
actuators, and automate some high level tasks. For example, a controller for an elevator takes
in input from a number of buttons and shaft sensors and it determines where to move the lift.
In the past, these simple logic operations could be done by PLCs, but controllers have evolved
overtime to include additional functionality. PLCs are real-time computers used in BAS and other
high-assurance industrial control systems, but in many cases they are being replaced. They are
built to be highly reliable and easy to configure; the can be programmed with ladder-logic style
GUI interfaces.
To meet consumer demands for additional functionality and energy efficiency, the BAS in-
dustry has been responding with incredible innovation. This means the PLCs are often replaced
with smarter embedded systems which are running large software stacks, like BAJA. BAJA, or The
Building Automation Java Architecture, is a standard programming platform for BAS controllers
which has facilitated their rapid growth in functionality. Controllers have traditionally been on
isolated internal networks, so developers have focused on maintaining functionality rather than
security. More functionality and better software also puts pressure to support remote management
and updates. We observe that this leap in functionality, combined with the convergence of IT and
OT networks for commercial buildings, creates a serious potential for danger for these systems.
2.3 Cybersecurity Analysis
We have observed cybersecurity issues with building network design and controller design
through a number of exploits and demonstrated attacks. We will analyze a few meaningful attacks
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and discuss what general security issues are present in these scenarios. Additionally, the industry
has well-known security issues that remain unsolved, which we will discuss.
2.3.1 Network Security
Security Consultant Jesus Molina demonstrated at DEFCON 22 and Blackhat USA 2014 that
he could abuse the building control systems in a hotel once he was able to join the network [9]. The
hotel had a tablet in each room which served as a management device for a KNX router/controller
(serving as the automation layer) in each room. A user could control the TV, music, and lighting
on the tablet, which would send KNX/IP to the KNX router/controller, which would in turn send
commands to the devices themselves. He showed that the because KNX (the building network
protocol used in the hotel) had no encryption when communicating between the management
layer and automation layer. This allowed him to observe and manipulate traffic; furthermore, the
automation layer router/controller had no authentication and would blindly take commands from
any computer on the network. At its core, Molina’s work points out the glaring lack of basic
security for these systems and protocols, and it shows that any third party device or application
with network access is potentially a threat.
In 2013, Brad Bower demonstrated at Shmoocon an attack framework designed to leverage
the inherent security weaknesses in this system [10]. His “BACnet Attack Framework” abuses
the same lack of authentication and encryption to automatically enumerate and control devices
remotely. Bower explored a feature of the BACnet protocol which allowed him to configure a field
device into “high priority” mode. Once in this state, the device would ignore all traffic, except
traffic from him, effectively creating a denial of service. This is another instance where basic
authentication and encryption would prevent this form of abuse. It also highlights a issue of lack of
fine-grained access control this action and for the system in general. These two security researchers
demonstrate that each layer of the network is vulnerable; however, attackers generally start with
access in the management layer and move towards the field devices (Figure 2.2).
The current de facto standard BAN protocols, such as BACnet and KNX, were designed in
the 80’s and 90’s. They do not support modern security mechanisms, and often do not consider
security in their design [20]. In 2004 the BACnet network security specification was published,
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Figure 2.2: Model of observed attack approaches for building networks.
which introduced support for standard cryptographic protection [17]. However even newer BANs
do not support these specifications for backward compatibility reasons.
As a result of this situation, critical BAS systems have to rely on “air gaps” and “security
by obscurity.” Ostensibly, “air gapped” networks are isolated from outside influence because they
are not connected to outside networks. The Stuxnet attack is a prime example of this approach
failing to defend against attacks that utilize non-network means (e.g., USB drives) to break the
air gap [21, 22]. Furthermore, contrary to common belief numerous BASs are not “air gapped” at
all [23]. According to the search engine Shodan, in the U.S. there are over 50,000 exposed buildings
on the Internet that can be directly accessed due to unintended misconfiguration [7]. With modern
BASs moving towards more intelligent controls that heavily rely upon communication with the
outside world, such air-gapping approach may not even be feasible. Once the air gap is broken, the
whole BAN is vulnerable to attack.
Many facilities rely upon gateway firewalls for BAN security. In recent years much research
effort has been put towards developing intrusion detection system (IDS) for industrial control sys-
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tems [24].. While they add an additional layer of protection, firewalls and IDS alone are not
sufficient. Firewalls must allow certain traffic through and cyber attacks can be successfully car-
ried through legitimate communication paths. Due to real-time constraints in industrial control
systems, it is hard to act upon suspicious traffic detected by IDS [25], especially given the fact that
traditionally IDS tends to produce a large amount of false positives [26]. This may be particularly
problematic in a BAS environment where devices are highly heterogeneous.
2.3.2 Controller Security
Prior to the discovery of Stuxnet attack in June 2010 [4], the security of controllers received
little attention. While in the Stuxnet case this PLC was controlling a centrifuge, these PLCs are
found in a wide range of contexts including industrial BAS. Following this event, the work of many
researchers uncovered numerous problems with the systems involved [6, 5]. At Blackhat 2011,
Dillon Beresford demonstrated an attack on a Siemens Simatic S7 PLC [8]. This PLC was the
exact model used in the Iranian nuclear facilities which were damaged by Stuxnet. While in the
Stuxnet case this PLC was controlling a centrifuge, these PLCs are found in a wide range of contexts
including industrial BAS. In Beresford’s analysis he noted that these devices ran both TELNET
and HTTP daemons which were intended to be used by Siemens developers. He was able to easily
dump the firmware and memory contents, and he found source code which had been left on the
device. Beresford demonstrated a reply attack on this PLC which abused the lack of access control
and weak, flawed, and granular authentication on the device. This work clearly demonstrated that
the technique required to attack a PLC is no more difficult than attacking any other computer.
In Billy Rios’s Black Hat 2014 talk, he discussed the landscape of BAS security for more spe-
cialized, non-PLC BAS controllers [7]. In his analysis his team revealed that controllers generally
run either Windows, Linux or QNX operating systems. They also discovered that the applications
running on these systems widely are executing on “superuser” privileged accounts like root and
SYSTEM for Linux/QNX and Windows respectively. Rios’s team found devices with unauthenti-
cated telnet and FTP servers open, and many devices were managed with java-based web interface
applications. He also presented a number of vulnerabilities involving the web interface. His findings
reveal a severe lack of basic software security techniques, but ultimately reveal issues of missing or
9
weak access control mechanisms. Furthermore the criticality of the various application is highly
mixed, but non-critical applications are given the same privileges as critical applications.
The Traditional OSs found on building controllers are built to expose hardware resources for
fair use by applications. Any process has equal privilege to request services from device drivers. To
conduct network communication in a Unix-like OS, processes can open ports by simply requesting
a socket and writing to a memory mapped file. From a both safety and security perspective,
network communication should be a privilege. In essence, any compromised processes can send
out outbound communication and conduct DoS attacks on the network. Moreover, if a malicious
process gains more privilege, it can control the whole device and arbitrarily manipulate the inbound
and outbound network traffic. Using such systems, compromised processes in BASs can easily abuse
network resources and spread viruses throughout a BAN [27]. Recent massive DDoS attacks that
take advantage of compromised IoT botnets are emblematic examples of this problem [28] [29]. In
contrast to general purpose computing platforms, embedded systems, such as BAS field devices,
have limited resources and fixed functionality; thus, they often have strict real-time requirements.
Due to availability and real-time constraints standard firewall solutions might not be appropriate
for such an environment. Furthermore, system firewalls typically use coarse-grained discretionary
access control models. Applications are either fully allowed or denied the network access based
on the identity of the applications. This model is not sufficient for secure control systems like
BASs, since compromised applications with authorized identity will allow attackers to arbitrarily
abuse the network resources. The tight integration among subsystems requires fine-grained access
control.
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CHAPTER 3: DESIGN DEVELOPMENT
In light of the security challenges for building automation systems discussed in the past
chapter, we need a solution that mitigates these problems while also adhering to several constraints.
To channel our solution design in a meaningful direction, we focused on several high-level goals
extracted from our observations of building controllers.
• Isolation: Because of the increase in non-critical functionality within BAS controllers, we see
a need for strong separation between critical and non-critical applications.
• Authentication: Controllers need a way of verifying the authenticity of incoming commands.
• Access Control: Our solution must be able to provide fine-grained access control for actions
and agents in the system.
• Reliability: Building networks and devices need to be able to provide services to occupants
without interruption even in the face of partial compromise.
• Longevity: While newer building systems may be able to update firmware of devices in the
field, this may not always be the case for some buildings. Thus, the break-and-patch cycle
doesn’t work well for building systems in general, and solutions must find a way to slow down
or break this cycle.
• Efficiency: While timing constraints for building systems are relatively loose when compared
to other domains, any solution must be able to meet performance requirements of embedded
BAS controllers. Specifically, this means that our design must work well on similar processor
models without creating significant overhead.
The trend towards more intelligent controls in BASs necessitates running processes with
different criticality levels in the same BAS, and even on the same embedded controller. In order
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to protect safety-critical building applications in such mixed-criticality systems (MCS), a robust
distributed real-time embedded architecture must isolate applications and regulate local resource
usage. From a security perspective, any interprocess communication (IPC) is potentially vulnerable
to attacks, if not regulated and properly validated. Traditional monolithic operating systems (e.g.,
Linux) encompass all OS services as privileged-mode tasks in kernel space. Compromising any
code running in privileged-mode (for example device drivers) gives attackers the highest privilege
in system, thus bypassing any security controls. The large code base of a monolithic kernel also
means they have greater attack surface for potential privilege escalation exploits. Naturally, because
of these issues, we examined a different kind of operating system kernel which has a greater potential
to meet our design goals.
3.1 The Microkernel: an Easier Path to Security for BAS
The microkernel architecture was developed as a response to the challenges of Operating
System development [30]. Following the strict minimality principle in microkernel design, all func-
tionality in the privileged kernel code must be justified [31]. As a result, the kernel itself only
contains the most important features, including:
1. an abstraction of execution on the CPU cores with threads
2. a thin abstraction of virtual memory hardware functionality
3. a mechanism of communication between virtual address space boundaries
Other OS services, such as the file system, process manager, device drivers, etc., all run in
isolated address spaces in user mode. When compared to monolithic-kernel OSs (e.g., Windows,
Linux and other UNIX-like systems), a microkernel OS has far less code running in privileged
mode. The small size of kernel makes it easier to implement correctly and gives researchers the
opportunity to formally prove its functional correctness. In fact, the seL4 microkernel is the first
formally verified bug-free OS kernel from abstract specification down to its binary code [32].
Furthermore, for microkernel architectures system service components and device drivers run
in user space as processes. This modular design allows microkernels to be more robust against
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failures and make the architecture more secure. Exploits of driver code won’t lead to a system-
wide privilege escalation, as will happen in monolithic kernels. Additionally, microkernels generally
do not dynamically allocate memory. This dramatically reduces probability for use-after-free and
related bugs which lead to memory-corruption exploits. One excellent example of the benefits
of this architecture are found in the self-repairing MINIX 3[33] microkernel OS. MINIX 3 uses a
“reincarnation server” to recover system services from failures.
Thanks to the advancement in hardware and OS design, microkernels have made vast strides
in performance improvements. The L4 microkernel family has achieved high performance though a
number of new techniques. With “fast-path” IPC techniques on seL4 messages between processes
can be transferred in 300 microseconds on ARM chips common for embedded systems [34].
3.2 The seL4 Microkernel
seL4 is a fast, high-assurance microkernel, developed by the Trustworthy Systems Group at
Data61 [32]. As mentioned before, the entire microkernel has been formally proven to be cor-
rect from the top-level specification down to machine code. Notably, this proof assures that the
microkernel has no implementation bugs, including common memory corruption errors like buffer
overflows, null-pointer dereferences, etc. Additionally, they have shown that its specification as-
sures the security and safety properties of confidentiality, availability, and integrity for the kernel.
At the time of the writing, seL4 boasts the lowest IPC times for any major microkernel, which is a
well-known microbenchmark for this architecture. Clearly, seL4 is a strong option for implementing
a high assurance BAS, so we will explore its key features for use in building systems.
3.2.1 Access Control Primitives
The seL4 microkernel uses a capability-based access control mechanism to regulate access
for all kernel objects, including page tables, thread control blocks, and IPC end points. In the
modern L4-style approach, the kernel performs policy enforcement, but the policy definition itself
lies in user-space to ensure kernel minimality principles are maintained [35]. A capability in seL4
is a token of authority over some kernel object, but it is also used as a reference to that object;
to perform an operation on an object, a thread must supply that object’s capability. For seL4,
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threads are the agents which can perform actions and are the finest grain of precision for capability
ownership.
One of the major boons to the security of the system is the fact that all channels of com-
munication must be explicitly defined1. This includes two major channels: message passing and
shared memory. Message passing IPC is allowed in seL4 through endpoint objects. Two threads
can communicate with messages if they both posses a capability to a shared endpoint, and those
capabilities can be further restricted to specific rights (e.g., Read or Write). Threads send and
receive messages in a synchronous rendezvous, with either blocking or non-blocking approaches.
The rendezvous is always between two threads, a sender and a receiver where a single message is
transferred by the kernel. If a second party is not waiting at the time when a thread initiates a
send or receive, then it can either wait (blocking) or continue (non-blocking). Waiting threads’
control block (TCBs) objects are queued from the endpoint object.
seL4 provides a number of system calls for communication among threads, but generally
these follow two patterns. The send/receive pattern is a straightforwards unidirectional message
pass using seL4 Send() and seL4 Recv(). The sending thread must posses a capability to the
endpoint with the Write right; essentially, Write is encoded as send for endpoint capabilities.
Likewise the receiving thread must posses a capability with the Read right. The second supported
IPC pattern is call/reply using seL4 Call(), seL4 Recv(), and seL4 Reply(). This pattern provides
basic support for remote procedure call (RPC) style semantics for threads in a client-server style
relationship. The client thread posses a capability with Write and Grant rights (the Grant right
allows a thread to transfer a capability to another thread following the take-grant model [38]). The
server thread uses a capability with Read rights, and listens using the seL4 Recv(). When the client
initiates communication using the seL4 Call() the kernel grants the server a special one-time reply
capability, so the server can reply.
Shared pages of memory are another possible communication channel among threads. The
kernel provides a thin API for the virtual memory system, but in general it is up to the user
processes to setup virtual memory spaces using capabilities. This means that pages of physical
1 Covert timing channels are still problematic for all modern systems [36], through there is on going work on
counter measures [37]
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memory are also controlled with capabilities. In order to map a physical page into a thread’s
virtual memory space, a thread must have a capability for both a physical page, and its virtual
space object. A virtual space object is a kernel object for book keeping a thread’s or group of
threads’ virtual memory address space. Thus, for shared memory based communication, some
privileged thread would need to map the same physical page into the address space of the sender
and receiver threads.
These two systems, message passing and virtual memory, highlight current challenges with
developing an operating system and applications on top of seL4. System engineers must do an
exorbitant amount of effort to define and setup basic services. Some efforts have been made
however to improve this situation, notably, the Capability Distribution Language (CapDL) [39]
and Component Architectures for Microkernel Embedded Systems Tool (CAmkES) [40].
3.2.2 Verified Starting and Capability Distribution
Once seL4 finishes booting, it hands a set of capabilities to the root task (the first user
process). In most systems, this root task is in charge of starting new processes and distributing
capabilities to them. While we can trust the kernel to enforce the capability-based access control
that the root task sets up, the process of setting up is highly tedious and prone to error. To
solve these problems Kuz et al. presented a language for describing how capabilities should be
distributed: the Capability Distribution Language (CapDL) [39].
With CapDL, engineers and developers have a precise way to describe capability-based sys-
tems, like ones based on seL4. Furthermore, Kuz et al. developed a tool which can generate a root
task which can automatically distribute capabilities according to a CapDL specification. This tool
greatly simplifies the fine grained access over kernel objects, and also allows engineers to reason
about the security of their system designs. Later, in 2013, Boyton et al. provide a formal proof of a
general root task which takes a CapDL specification and starts up the system correctly [41]. With
this effort, a good deal of work is diminished for engineers; however, even with this tool, CapDL
specs are often large, unwieldy, and difficult to write. In order to help ameliorate this further
difficulty, work has been done to automatically generate CapDL specs given a description of the
system architecture.
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3.2.3 Static Component Architectures
Component architectures are common among high-assurance embedded systems. Generally
these systems have a static set of tasks or processes which are interconnected in various ways to
build some control or sensing application. These systems are often designed using architecture
design languages, like AADL [13]. With AADL, system engineers can do some analysis to verify
certain properties of their system, and they can also automatically generate the framework and
plumbing code to implement the framework’s description. The vision for seL4 is to also support
this functionality for component architecture descriptions, but also to provide a path towards full
system verification.
To realize this goal, Kuz et al. developed a language called CAmkES, or Component Architec-
tures for Microkernel Embedded Systems [40]. This architecture description language (ADL) was
initially developed for the L4/Iguana microkernel, but is often used for seL4 now. This high-level
language allows a system engineer to write an process/task/component architecture description for
an seL4 system in a compact form. After parsed the description, the CAmkES tool produces the
“RPC stub code” needed to implement the seL4 communication patterns described above and a
CapDL specification for the root task. The CAmkES language allows us to setup components to
communicate according to the seL4 patterns discussed above, send/receive and call/reply. It will
decide how many threads and endpoints are needed and it can configure the virtual memory space
of each component.
In 2015, Fernandez et al. expanded the CAmkES tool to also produce machine checkable
proofs in Isabell/HOL [42, 43]. Their work was a large step forward in building a fully verified
system. With 1) seL4’s proof of binary correctness, 2) CapDL’s proof of correct start, and 3)
CAmkES machine checkable proofs of the RPC stub code, system engineers need to only prove
that the “business logic” of their component are implemented correctly. All of these proofs can be
composed together to make strong formal security and safety guarantees about a system.
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CHAPTER 4: DESIGN
In order to meet our design goals and to mitigate the discussed security flaws in building
automation systems, we designed a framework for securing local IPC and network communication.
As discussed in the previous chapter, seL4 has strong assurance of process isolation, and it supports
security guarantees for its IPC mechanisms. Because the seL4 kernel is positioned to allow, deny,
or otherwise referee all IPC, it plays a vital role in this our design. Already, without any design
effort, we have been given fine-grained access control for communication among applications on a
BAS controller.
4.1 Local Application Communication
In a building controller, the path through which data flows among applications generally
remains constant due to the nature of the domain. This means that the microkernel can enforce a
static policy definition upon the IPC. In seL4’s case, this also means we only need to instantiate a
fixed number of endpoints and capabilities to distribute once, and from there these objects do not
change. In our design we use the CapDL root task, discussed in Chapter 3, to correctly distribute
all the capabilities at boot time. We also use CAmkES to define a process component architecture
for a controller, which will in turn configure the root task and generate an RPC-like API for the
components.
While the local communication aspect of this design is a straightforward application of existing
work, it is an important first step for later stages of the design. These stages focus on dealing with
the challenging access control and authentication issues for building networks.
4.2 A Communication Framework for Building Networks
In microkernel architectures, system services and device drivers execute outside of the kernel
and run as user processes. For a monolithic kernel, a system call is used to access these kernel
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Figure 4.1: Two controllers enforcing global policy locally, allowing process A to communicate with
process B over remote proxies.
resources, but for microkernel-based OSs these “systems calls” simply take the form of IPC. Thus,
IPC policy can be applied to system resources, which we leverage in our design. Access to the
ethernet driver, TCP/IP stack, and BACnet stack all require IPC, and in our design we will limit
access to these resources to a set of trusted proxy processes.
4.2.1 Proxies
Leveraging the microkernel architecture, we can map network communications to local inter-
process communications and enforce the control policy through the local mandatory access control.
In our secure communication framework, we introduce a lightweight proxy process to achieve this
mapping. In this design, building control processes are not given network communication privilege;
instead, we delegate all network communications to proxies. A proxy process is a local delegate
for a remote process on a separate controller. All network communication to remote processes is
routed through proxies; thus, allowing IPC policy to dictate valid remote communication. When
building control processes need use the network, the traffic is forwarded by a dedicated light-weight
proxy process. During this process the kernel vets the IPC request according to specific application
communication policy. Figure 4.1 demonstrates a simple two-controller, two-process example of
this framework. In the figure Proxy A is a proxy for Process A and Proxy B is a proxy for Process
B. Process A sends messages to Proxy B, witch forwards the traffic across the network to Proxy A,
which forwards the message to Process B.
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One advantage of deploying proxy processes in this way is that we can encode high-level,
network communication policy as local IPC policy with seL4 capability primitives. Figure 4.1
shows how a logical global policy of “A→ B” is encoded as Process A→ Proxy B and Proxy A→
Process B. On seL4 this can be realized with a shared endpoint object for each pair of proxy and
process and with a capability for each process. This high-level or global policy could be potentially
described in a domain specific language which could make reasoning about the security of the whole
building network an easier task.
4.2.2 Tunneling
As we discussed in Chapter 2 building automation communication protocols are typically not
encrypted and are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and other common network attacks. We
observed that communication lacks consistent authentication, and building controllers blindly ac-
cept commands from 3rd parties on the network. Furthermore, controllers send potentially sensitive
data in cleartext to management systems opening the system to privacy concerns. Since adoption
of encryption standards for building systems has been virtually non-existent, our framework needs
to address this issue in a way that will be compatible with legacy systems.
With the addition of proxy processes dedicating the network communication, we abstract
away the inter-device communication from the control applications. Control applications only
conduct IPCs between other applications and proxies. Inter-device communications are transparent
for control applications. Using this layer of indirection we can tunnel communication from controller
to controller using standard encryption solutions. The data would flow from a BAS process to a
proxy process via IPC; then it would be encrypted and forwarded to the network driver. The
receiving controller would forward incoming traffic to the listening proxy, which would decrypt and
dispatch the message to the destination BAS process.
Using standard encryption techniques isn’t a panacea for building networks; the problem of
authentication and identity remains. In other words, the classical key-agreement problem must be
resolved in a meaningful way for BANs. One simple solution would be to issue a unique signed
certificate for each proxy or each device; however, this puts significant pressure on the certificate
authority. If a BAS vendor cryptographically signs all the certificates, they must keep their private
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keys safe, and any vendor compromise could lead to widespread impact. Another solution could be
to use a single static key for all BAN traffic, but this would also lead to problems if a single device
is compromised in a way that leaks this key. On the other hand, a solution could involve using a
static key for each pair of proxy processes, so that if a single device leaks keys then the rest of the
network is still secure. However, this may not scale well due to the large memory usage of keys.
Fortunately, this problem has been well-studied in related domains for many years (for ex-
ample, in distributed sensor networks [44, 45]) . In theory, some symmetric key generation scheme
will be able to properly bootstrap communication between all the proxies. For example, Blom’s
work shows how using some secret data, a device could generate all the keys needed for communi-
cation [46]. In the future, a key distribution scheme which meets the needs of building automation
systems and networks will need to be devised.
For this work, we assume that a symmetric key has been generated for each pair of proxies that
need to communicate. This assumption allows proxies to verify incoming traffic using SSL/TLS-like
encryption. Assuming the problem of generating a valid encrypted message and hash is intractable,
no attacker can spoof messages to the proxies.
4.3 Design Summary
We expect the following benefits of both these design features (proxies and tunneling) for our
framework:
1. It isolates control logic and regulates usage of network resources. Compromised applications
cannot monopolize the network, and incoming network threats will first be vetted by the
communication framework.
2. It enables system designers to consider security in the design-phase at a high-level. The
framework maps system-wide access control to local access control, thus unifying controllers.
3. For applications, network connections are transparent. The application can be redeployed
into independent devices without worrying about the interconnectivity.
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4. It guarantees end-to-end security even in complex BAN environments where diverse protocols
and legacy devices are deployed. All communication can be encrypted based on the negotia-
tion of the pair of dedicated proxies and tunneled through standard control protocols, such
as BACnet, Modbus, etc.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter, we will discuss the implementation details for a prototype of our framework.
We implemented the framework in two steps. First we implemented a proof of concept of local
communication access control. Then we implemented the full proxy-based framework for network
communication.
5.1 Local Communication Access Control
In order to setup a building system using the seL4-based component architecture tool,
CAmkES, a number of steps are required. First the core services and applications must be de-
signed to meet the system requirements. Then, the hardware devices and system-on-chip (SoC)
functionality must be enumerated. After this, the system designer must write a CAmkES language
description of the applications and hardware drivers. Finally, the system designer must implement
the business logic of the applications and drivers following the architecture description.
Organizing applications as components for CAmkES isn’t a trivial task. Components need
to describe their public interfaces in a component listing. Provided services must be specified with
interfaces, which define the list of supported RPCs. Components must also declare the interfaces
that they use. The code snippets below (Figures 5.1, 5.2) give a simple example of a component
used to control the temperature.
1 component TempControlProcess {
2 provides IController current_temp;
3 provides ISensor status;
4 provides ISettings desired_temp;
5 uses IFan fan;
6 uses IAlarm alarm;
7 }
Figure 5.1: Example of a CAmkES component.
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1 procedure ISensor {
2 int get();
3 };
Figure 5.2: Example of a CAmkES interface.
These components are instantiated and interconnected in the assembly section (Figure 5.3).
The IPC policy is declared with connection statements. The type of connection statements can be a
internal type or custom predefined type; although, the seL4RPCCall type is generally suitable. This
type generates RPC stub code according to the seL4 Call/seL4 Reply communication paradigm.
5.2 Distributed Communication Framework
In our description of the framework implementation for proxy-based tunneled communication,
we will describe the system without the use of CAmkES or CapDL1. However, the implementa-
tion generally follows the overall design of CAmkES and CapDL. The root task instantiates all
the processes, proxies, endpoints, and capabilities and distributes them according to the system
architecture specification. It implements the local IPC policy by distributing capabilities to all the
processes and proxies.
As discussed in chapter 3, if a thread holds a capability to an IPC endpoint, then this thread
will be able to send or receive messages using this endpoint (depending on the specific permissions
of the capability itself). Like with many microkernels, seL4 IPC is a synchronous rendezvous
between two processes, using an endpoint object to coordinate. If a thread calls seL4 Call with
an endpoint capability, the process will send to the next waiting thread in the endpoint’s receiving
thread queue—or it will block in the endpoint’s sending thread queue if no thread is ready receive.
When an IPC send takes place, the kernel copies the message from the sending thread’s IPC buffer
page to the receiving thread’s IPC buffer page.
Using the root task to configure the virtual memory of the processes and proxies we explored
two forms of IPC, seL4 Call/seL4 Reply and shared memory. Shared memory can be established
between two processes for larger data transfers. Physical page frames, page tables, and page
1 Our reference implementations do not use CAmkES or CapDL to generate any code due to compatibility issues
with the network driver. There isn’t a fundamental mismatch with CAmkES and network drivers, and with additional
engineering effort these could be aligned for our platform.
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1 assembly {
2 composition {
3 /* Components (Processes) */
4 component AlarmProcess alarmProc;
5 component TempControlProcess tempProc;
6 component FanProcess fanProc;
7 component TempSensorProcess tempSensProc;
8 component WebInterface webInterface;
9
10 /* Connections (Policy) */
11 connection seL4RPCCall t_t(
12 from tempSensProc.current_temp,
13 to tempProc.current_temp);
14
15 connection seL4RPCCall t_a(
16 from tempProc.alarm,
17 to alarmProc.alarm);
18
19 connection seL4RPCCall t_f(
20 from tempProc.fan,
21 to fanProc.fan);
22
23 connection seL4RPCCall t_w(
24 from webInterface.status,
25 to tempProc.status);
26
27 connection seL4RPCCall w_t(
28 from webInterface.desired_temp,
29 to tempProc.desired_temp);
30 }
31 }
Figure 5.3: Example of a CAmkES assembly.
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directories are controlled via capabilities. For some thread to map a page into a virtual memory
space, that thread must hold capabilities to these objects. Our prototype root task can setup two
processes to share a page of memory for a simple shared memory setup.
5.2.1 Proxy Design
For our prototype we implemented a general proxy application which we instantiate as needed
in our design. Each controller that needs to send network traffic to a certain remote process will
instantiate a proxy for that remote process. Proxies follow a server design pattern; a single proxy
will communicate with local processes and forward the data onto the remote process. Since the
design is generic and the functionality is simple, we suggest that these proxies could be automatically
generated or even formally verified in the future.
We identified many possible ways to organize proxies using seL4 IPC primitives; we chose this
configuration because it was good fit for our network stack service. Our design uses two threads: 1)
one for waiting for incoming IPC from BAS control processes, and 2) one for waiting for incoming
network traffic. Local BAS control processes need to be able to either wait for incoming messages,
and they need to be able to send messages. We support these two needs by using the seL4 Call
and seL4 Reply semantics, which follow a remote procedure call (RPC) paradigm. If a process
uses seL4 Call, a one-time capability is given to the receiver to allow it to send a reply message.
Outgoing communication follows these steps:
1. BAS control processes use seL4 Call to initiate communication.
2. The proxy receives the message using seL4 Recv.
3. The proxy checks the validity of the application specific message content.
4. The proxy encrypts and forwards the outgoing message to the network stack process.
5. The proxy replies to the BAS control process indicating the message was sent.
Incoming communication follows these steps:
1. BAS control processes use seL4 Call to initiate communication.
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2. The proxy receives the message using seL4 Recv.
3. The proxy checks the validity of the application specific message content.
4. The proxy saves the reply capability and continues waiting for incoming local and network
messages.
5. Once a network message is received the proxy decrypts the message and dispatches it using
a saved reply capability.
5.2.2 Tunnel Design
Our implementation of the tunnel is a simple implementation of an SSL/TLS like connection.
The key goal of the tunnel is for the proxy to authenticate incoming messages, so that no attacker
can manipulate messages even if they control the network substrate. As mentioned in Chapter 4,
we assume that a symmetric key has been distributed for each pair of related proxies; thus, the
core TLS handshake isn’t part of this implementation. However, a simple handshake is needed
to synchronize a nonce for the message authentication code (MAC). Once the synchronization is
complete, standard TLS-style encryption can be used. A MAC is generated for outgoing messages,
and these are encrypted; the ciphertext is over the BAN to the receiving proxy. That proxy decrypts
the ciphertext and generates a MAC based on the plaintext. Finally, the receiving proxy compares
the two MACs to verify the authenticity of the message.
5.2.3 Illustrative Example
We provide an illustration of how the system works in a distributed environment with the
following example, as shown in Figure 5.4. Assume in a control scenario that involves three devices,
Controller A, Controller B, and Controller C. Controller A hosts a client process C1, Controller B
hosts a server process S1, and Controller C hosts a server process S2. Client process C1 requests
service from both server processes S1 and S2.
Using the proposed application communication framework we deploy server proxies, S1proxy A
and S2proxy A, on Controller A on behalf of S1 and S2 respectively. On Controller B we deploy
a client proxy, C1proxy B, on behalf of C1. Similarly, for communication between S2 and C1 on
Controller C a client proxy, C1proxy C is deployed. On each controller the communication policy
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Figure 5.4: Three device, four process scenario demonstrating the usage of cryptographic tunneling
between the proxies.
is enforced through OS policy enforcement primitive (ACM in security enhanced MINIX 3) and
(capability in seL4) in the kernel. Those proxies are assumed to be trusted and have access privilege
to the network infrastructure services.
When client C1 needs service from server S1 (either for data sharing or invoking remote
procedure calls), an IPC will be issued in the form of message passing. From C1’s point of view the
message is sent to server S1, but actually the message will first be vetted by the kernel according
to policy and then sent to proxy S1proxy A. Proxy then forwards the message to proxy C1proxy B
through the network using secure network tunnel between those two proxies. Eventually, the proxy
C1proxy B forwards the authenticated and decrypted message to process S1. The reply follows the
same route.
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CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION
6.1 Performance
For CPS and BAS, embedded system resources are often stretched very thin. Furthermore,
minimizing network latency is of great importance in real-world distributed systems due to real-
time requirements on system response times. Thus, any new features or designs must be weighed
in terms of performance cost.
Our application communication framework adds a number of proxy processes and crypto-
graphic tunneling into this strict performance environment. Context switching among processes
in different virtual memory spaces is generally slower than for threads in the same virtual space.
Additionally traditional UNIX-like IPC primitives are not tuned to transfer small bits data of
quickly, instead working well with large files and high-bandwidth transfers. Our framework would
likely have serious performance problems in this environment because of these reasons. However,
we observe that these specific disadvantages may not apply in the same way to microkernel systems
in this domain.
Historically, one of the main concerns for adopting a microkernel architecture was its lower
performance when compared to monolithic architectures. However, this concern has been negated
by modern hardware and OS design. Second and third generation microkernels have made great
strides in reducing IPC latency. Modern microkernels, such as seL4 and L4/Fiasco, achieve this high
performance through myriad code optimization techniques. In particular, the hallmark benchmark
of microkernel systems, IPC latency, has been demonstrated to be less than 100 nanoseconds
for some implementations. Overall, IPC performance is the most critical metric for microkernel
performance, since all component interactions occurs through IPC.
Because microkernels are highly tuned for IPC performance, we hypothesized that the addi-
tional overhead of proxy processes would be within tolerance for building automation controllers.
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Based on our observations of BAN traffic from local university BAS networks, devices exchange
data on network using BACnet protocols over UDP/IP. In the application layer, BACnet Applica-
tion Protocol Data Unit (APDU) is encapsulated in the UDP data portion. The maximum APDU
length can be as high a 1476 bytes; however, for backward compatibility, the size of BACnet packet
is usually limited to 480 bytes, which is specified in each APDU’s “MAX APDU Length Accepted”
field. Therefore, we only evaluate the performance of network latency up to 1024 bytes in each
situation. Furthermore, we see that the BAS traffic is relatively sparse (around 35 packets/sec for a
trunk of BAN involves around 40 devices), although more data is needed to confirm this. Because
of these low-bandwidth observations we didn’t measure bandwidth systematically (although we
were able to exceed the 35 packets/sec without any difficulty). Using these observations, we model
the workload of the building automation system.
6.1.1 Experimental Setup
To verify that our performance results corroborate well-known benchmarks of IPC latency, we
measure the local IPC roundtrip time for both seL4 and Linux. Through this we can also confirm
that exercising fine grained access control over IPC is feasible in terms of performance. We setup an
i.MX6 SABRE lite device (running an ARM A9) with both kernels. The seL4 installation had two
processes organized with “client” and “server” roles. The client process measured the roundtrip
time (RTT) for various IPC message sizes over 10,000 iterations. Time deltas are computed using
an ARM instruction to extract the clock cycle counter; in this case the i.MX6 runs at 1GHz, so each
cycle difference is 1ns. We also measured the RTT for a shared memory (shmem) configuration.
The shmem measurement included the time to copy a message into the shared page of memory,
then sending an IPC message to indicate that the copy was complete. For baseline performance
evaluation we setup an Ubuntu Xenial (16.04) installation running the linux kernel version 4.1.15.
This installation also ran a client/server process pair and used sockets to transfer messages between
them.
To evaluate the full latency overhead of our system, we also measure the full round trip
time over the network for a remote We setup two i.MX6 SABRE lite devices with an ethernet cable
connecting them. Once again we configure a client/server process pair; however, we also instantiate
29
Table 6.1: Measurements of IPC RTT for Linux and seL4.
Size (bytes)
Local IPC RTT (microseconds)
Linux Socket seL4 call/reply seL4 shmem
1 48.957 0.792 -
64 48.843 1.947* 0.801
128 49.405 2.339 1.067
256 49.383 2.627 1.192
512 50.018 3.268** 1.462
1024 50.866 - 1.997
* The jump here is caused by the seL4 “fastpath” optimization for small
messages.
** This trial is of 508 bytes (The largest supported IPC message size is
508 bytes).
a client proxy and server proxy. Over 10,000 iterations the client process messages the server proxy,
which encrypts and forwards the message. The client proxy receives the message and decrypts and
forwards it to the server. The server then instantiates a similar return trip to the remote client
process. The baseline Ubuntu installations are similarly setup, except with no proxies.
6.1.2 Results
On SABRE Lite board, as shown in Table 6.1, seL4’s local IPC round trip time (RTT)
outperforms UNIX Local Domain (ULD) socket, on Linux (Ubuntu Xenial 16.04, kernel version
4.1.15). Since seL4 has IPC message size limited to 508 bytes max, we use shared memory for
larger transfers (with IPC to synchronize). Using linux we can also setup shared memory for very
fast data transfers (though this is rarely used in practice); this configuration would likely match the
performance of seL4 shared memory. Unfortunately, the SABRE Lite Linux OSs we found weren’t
compiled with message queues enabled, but we expect that these have better performance than
ULD.
Network performance using UDP is shown in Table 6.2; the proposed proxy design on seL4
outperforms Linux at all message sizes. In fact, we observed that our framework with encryption on
seL4 outperformed Linux without encryption for all measured message sizes less than 1024 bytes.
The seL4 network stack used here is the Lightweight IP (LWIP) stack. The network latency on seL4
may increase with a full-fledged seL4-based OS; however, these results indicate that our proposed
communication framework does not add much performance overhead.
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Table 6.2: Measurements of UDP RTT for Linux and our framework on seL4 using two controllers.
Size (bytes)
Network RTT
(microseconds)
Network RTT with
Encryption (microseconds)
Linux
seL4
(Proxies)
Linux
seL4
(Proxies)
64 337.1 84.5 425.5 125.4
128 340.7 133.7 499.2 160.6
256 408.6 186.6 582.2 237.0
512 509.6 293.0 783.3 391.1
1024 702.5 569.0 1174.1 762.4
6.1.3 Observations
For our minimal implementation on seL4 we observed some overall performance gains over
a more traditional linux implementation. With this data, we hesitate to make any premature
claims about the performance of our proxy-based communication framework. This is because
the performance of our implementation relies on the performance of both seL4, LWIP, and our
encryption library (we ported code from the OpenSSL library). Our baseline performance was
almost entirely dependent on the linux kernel, the network stack, and OpenSSL. Because our
framework relies on the core features of seL4, we only compared the two implementations as whole
systems, and the precise overhead of the proxies and encryption is a separate observation.
We do observe that the result of adding encryption to the communication framework adds an
average of 28% overhead. Because our measured local IPC performance was generally two orders
of magnitude less than the network performance, we can clearly see that the biggest factor in
performance is not the proxies. This implies that our framework’s performance overhead is also
around 28% for comparable seL4 systems (although, to the best of our knowledge no building
system is using seL4). Despite this performance hit, our framework on seL4 still outperforms the
linux-based’s cleartext traffic RTT on packet sizes less than 1024. For reference, when we added
encryption to traffic for our linux-based implementation it adds 38% overhead.
A finely tuned linux-based system may be able to achieve similar network performance; how-
ever, this result suggests that migrating to a minimal seL4-based system could bring performance
improvements. We warn that this evaluation is not an accurate wholistic benchmark for systemat-
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ically comparing different OSs’ kernel performance, rather it’s a domain-specific microbenchmark.
Nonetheless, the result provides a preliminary evaluation of the communication framework in the
building domain. The proposed approach shows promising results with good performance tradeoff
for the overall security and safety benefits. Based on our measurements and our live BAN data,
we claim that the proposed communication framework on seL4 is sufficient for BANs’ performance
requirements.
6.2 Effectiveness
As pointed out by Bhatkar, Sekar, and DuVarney, evaluating effectiveness can take two gen-
eral forms: experimentation or analysis [47]. They argue that in some cases experimentation isn’t
enough evidence to demonstrate the true effectiveness of the implementation. Likewise, demonstrat-
ing the effectiveness of our communication framework in mitigating the specific observed attacks
(for example CVEs or ICS-CERTs) isn’t a complete picture. The result of this kind of experimen-
tation for our framework is simply this: either the attack works or it doesn’t. So, in addition to
performing experiments on a model building automation system, we also perform an analysis of
potential attacks. We will also discuss our design goals and explore our solution’s effectiveness at
meeting those goals.
6.2.1 Case Study: HVAC System
We base our experimental security evaluation on a reference implementation of a distributed,
critical HVAC system, like the ones found in data centers or temperature sensitive laboratories.
We developed this model HVAC system with guidance from industry partners, and it captures our
observations of live HVAC systems. We will also explore how the framework specifically mitigates
the common attacks seen on buildings.
The application model for the HVAC temperature control scenario as shown in figure 6.1. In
this model we have three devices, highlighting the major layers of building automation networks.
For this scenario, we have simplified the network with a flat architecture using BACnet/IP; al-
though, in more complex network the automation controller can act as a network gateway. The
Management Console is typically used by a facility manager to maintain and monitor buildings’
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Figure 6.1: Model of high-level application communication patterns in a distributed HVAC system.
different subsystems. The automation controller is in charge of reporting data to the management
interface, and it manages high-level logic for the third device, the Air Handler Unit (AHU). The
AHU performs sensing and actuation of the building’s environment.
All of the attacks we observed in Chapter 2 originated from either the management console
or some attacker with similar network privileges as the management interface. We also observed
a single essential component of each attack: spoofing or abusing lack of authentication. We will
assume that the attack is attempting to gain direct control over the AHU or automation controller,
with the ultimate goal of being able to arbitrarily control the physical environment. We also
assume that the Web Interface process running on the automation controller is a vulnerable legacy
application which needs full network access.
In this scenario, we modeled to kinds of attacks:
1. An attacker exploits the vulnerable application on the automation controller and uses it to
gain further control (Figure 6.2).
2. An attacker spoofs messages directly to the AHU in an attempt to directly manipulate the
actuation (Figure 6.3).
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of compromised management console and web interface process threat to
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We implemented the automation controller and AHU using both a traditional unix-like im-
plementation and using our communication framework on top of seL4. For both implementations
we used SABRE lite boards, and for the traditional system used a Ubuntu Xenial (16.04) in-
stallation. The source for these implementations can be found on Github here (Traditional) and
here (Experimental).
We executed both attacks on both versions of the system. As expected, on the traditional
implementation we were able launch both attack from the management console that allowed unsafe
access to the physical environment. When we launched the same attacks on the systems running
our communication framework the attack failed.
6.2.2 Analysis: Attacks from the Network
As discussed in Chapter 2, network-based attacks pose great challenges for distributed BASs.
Many attacks specifically target weaknesses in industrial control and communication protocols. We
see three kinds of attacks on BANs today: identity spoofing attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks,
and DoS attacks.
Many industrial communication protocols can support routing traffic over TCP/IP and Eth-
ernet (e.g., BACnet/IP, KNX/IP). Using well-known techniques, an attacker on the same network
can arbitrarily send spoofed packets to control devices. However, this attack’s impact can be com-
plete prevented using the framework prototype. This is because the proxy handles inter-device
authentication and encryption. Those spoofing packets weren’t encrypted with the correct sym-
metric key used between two remote proxies, so the spoofed message can be dropped and reported
by the proxy. Similarly, with correct implementation of the secure network tunnel, there is no way
attacker can conduct man-in-the-middle attacks without obtaining the secret key. At most the
attacker can do is simply forward the messages, but since the message authentication code (MAC)
contains a nonce, replay attacks can be mitigated with good certainty.
On the other hand, one of the most influential attacks on a BAN is DoS attack. DoS attack
seeks to exhaust computing and network resources in a system. With the access of network,
attackers can flood the network and temporarily disrupt the connection between two controllers.
Although the attackers might not be able to infiltrate into the control system, through DoS they
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might prevent or delay the sensor data to be delivered by the temperature control process across
network. Without a proxy the airflow control process would be busy handling all those false
requests from network. However, using the proposed communication framework, only proxies will
be directly impacted, the control loop in airflow control process would be still intact. Although it
cannot receive the current real-time pressure differential, it still maintains control and can turn on
the alarm or adjust the dampers. Of course if the alarm actuator process is also a remote process,
it might be impacted as well, this guarantee depends on how the system is integrated and deployed.
But in general the proxies work like application specific firewalls and filter out invalid requests with
high accurate. Furthermore, although to completely rule out the impacts of DoS attack, additional
network level protection are needed, the proxy can help detect unauthorized network traffic against
the system policy and report spurious behaviors from the BAN.
6.2.3 Analysis: Compromised Interface Process
For most network-facing applications, cyber attack is a constant threat. If an attacker can
find misconfiguration or vulnerabilities in the user interface process, the attacker can arbitrarily
control the process. With the assumption that a single non-critical process on some controller is
compromised, we estimate the potential impact. In a traditional system, the attacker might be
able to invoke system calls, such as kill, fork, etc. Additionally, The attacker could also try to
spoof local IPC messages to sockets, or attempt to exploit the operating system to gain additional
privileges. Recent cache inference exploits, Meltdown [48] and Spectre [49], could also be launched
by an attacker to attempt to read sensitive information from the kernel. An attacker could also
simply attempt to use as much CPU or other resources as possible, thus denying service to the
critical applications. The impacts of these attacks are potentially devastating to the integrity of
the controller, and with existing systems we believe these attacks are highly likely to succeed.
With our framework we have fine grained control over application privileges. On microkernel
systems with traditional posix system calls (e.g., MINIX 3), kill and fork are implemented with
IPC so these can also be managed with IPC policy. Likewise spoofing IPC isn’t possible due to the
guarantees we get from seL4. We can be confident that seL4 isn’t going to be exploited, due to its
proof of functional correctness implying the absence of implementation bugs.
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Meltdown and Spectre highlight an interesting caveat in the seL4 proof, however. That is,
the proof of seL4 assumes a particular model of the hardware. The current software-hardware
contract used today makes it challenging to reason about these two attacks, but additional efforts
are underway to correctly resolve the issue. These attacks pose potential danger for BAS (and most
systems), and should be considered carefully. Unfortunately, this attack isn’t within the scope of
our defense.
While timing constraints for building automation controllers are usually very relaxed, an
attacker could potentially consume enough CPU to affect the timing of the system. In order to
fully minimize the impact of this level of compromise, legacy application should be running in a
resource restricted partition with restricted real-time scheduler. seL4 is is currently working on
support for provable time-based partitioning [50] In future work we plan to use this functionality
to defend against this kind of attack.
6.2.4 Analysis: Compromised Field Level Control Process
Finally the field level processes, also have chances to be compromised. This could be possible if
an attacker gained physical access to a field device (like a thermostat, for example). In a traditional
system, an attacker could use this device to attempt to gain control of other field devices. In this
case they could control a host subnet of field devices, due to the lack of authentication in building
protocols.
With our framework we can limit the damage that an attacker could do with a single process
on a field device. If the field device supports a network medium which supports the microkernel
architecture with cryptographic tunneling we have discussed in this paper, then the compromised
field device could not abuse its network access. The compromised process must then obey the
local IPC access control. However, in some cases it may not be feasible to support a microkernel
architecture with tunneling on some small embedded field devices; for example, if a device’s CPU
doesn’t have an MMU then seL4 isn’t an option. In these cases, another security solution is needed.
6.2.5 Analysis: Design Goals
In general, based on experimentation and analysis, we explored the effectiveness of this ap-
plication communication framework for building automation systems. We show how potential risks
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of common network-based attacks can be prevented or minimized without replacing existing indus-
trial control protocols and legacy applications completely. Even if attackers are able to compromise
some of the processes, they won’t have total authority. Hence, no single device is solely in charge
of the security of the whole system.
To summarize the analysis we will examine our designs effectiveness of meeting our design
goals.
• Isolation: Using seL4’s formally verified access control mechanisms to control virtual memory,
we can claim isolation for processes on a single controller.
• Authentication: With an SSL/TLS-like tunnel, our framework’s proxies can authenticate
incoming traffic using a MAC.
• Access Control: Local access control for all memory and kernel services is provided by seL4.
Network access control is derived from these properties by mapping local IPC to network
communication, allowing seL4 enforce policy on network communication.
• Reliability: Our framework doesn’t rely on single intrusion detection device or firewall to
provide security, so no device is a single point of failure. In the case of partial compromise,
an attacker is limited to the privileges of the compromised process.
• Longevity: We attempted to slow down or stop the “break-and-patch” cycle for building
controllers by presenting a ground up solution based on the robust microkernel architecture.
Additionally, with seL4’s and CapDL’s proof of functional correctness, along with automated
proof generation for CAmkES generated code, we argue that far less code will be susceptible
to this cycle.
• Efficiency: Our measurements showed promising preliminary performance results on plat-
forms highly similar to ones used for building controllers.
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CHAPTER 7: RELATED WORK
In the past, researchers have explored different areas in the field of building automation
security.
Additionally, because our work relies on the security properties of microkernel systems, we
also explore SELinux, which has similar properties.
7.1 Building Automation Security
In a 2009 paper, researchers discussed the use of cryptographic technology to secure build-
ing automation communication over IP networks [51]. Three common building network mediums
BACnet, KNXnet, and LonWorks each have standards for how data can be sent over IP networks
(e.g. BACnet/IP, KNXnet/IP, and LonWorks/IP). The researchers analyzed existing methods
for securing IP networks and concluded that none of these meet all the requirements of today’s
BAS. They present a modification to the TPC/IP stack to allow for secure communication over
an IP backbone. Before the application layer, a security layer is added to enable cryptographic
communication between controllers in a VPN-like environment.
The challenges for securing Building Automation Systems was studied in 2010 by Granzer
et al. [19]. They look at the varied threats at each level of the system, from network to software to
side channel and so on. In their paper, they present a systematic analysis of traditional software
methods to improve the security of BAS control applications. Later in 2016, the same research
group detailed a secure BAS architecture for control applications [52]. Their new paper takes a
hybrid approach based on their past security analysis; different security techniques are used in
conjunction to provide a more secure system. They present a series of requirements aimed at
improving the state of BAS security, and they give a method which executes control applications
in sandboxes. These sandboxes are monitored and managed by lower-layer software in a hierarchal
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architecture. This lower-layer enforces the high-level system requirements while also doing intrusion
detection work.
The vision of these researchers has many commonalities with our framework. However, our
approach leverages the benefits of working with a microkernel, including the improved robustness
against privilege escalation. Furthermore, because of our application of the distributed proxy design
pattern we are able to apply global policy locally, thus simplifying the design process.
7.2 SELinux
Much work has been carried out to design secure operating systems. One of the most well-
known works is Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [53]. SELinux enforces mandatory access
control by monitoring and checking process operations against kernel-stored policy. SELinux lever-
ages the Linux Security Module (LSM) hooks to implement those checks in the kernel. However,
having the reference monitor does not change the fact that the underlying Linux OS adopts a
monolithic kernel architecture. The effectiveness of the reference monitor hinges on whether the
whole Linux kernel, including all the device drivers, is free of security bugs. Moreover, due to
the complexity of Linux, the system requires complex protection state representation that involves
extensive amounts of explicitly defined type labels and policies to express all the necessary access
relationships [54]. As a result it is hard, if not impossible, to understand and reason about the
correctness of an SELinux policy. Compared to the SELinux approach, our solution takes advan-
tage of the microkernel architecture. Since the policy only needs to concern the IPC primitive,
the policies are much simpler and easy to reason about. More importantly, the modular design
in microkernel architectures reduce the chance of kernel space vulnerability. This better suits the
embedded system domain.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
Our proposed communication framework aims to provide a secure foundation for embedded
devices in BAS. By leveraging the microkernel architecture we present a simple, unified way to
enforce global communication policies in distributed BANs that can be tailored to the needs of a
specific building. Through the deployment of lightweight proxy processes we enable the kernel to
enforce policy on network communication. Furthermore, through the communication abstraction
provided by proxy processes, we apply cryptographic tunneling for point to point communication.
These features are enabled by the microkernel’s strong process isolation and fine-grained access
control for IPC.
Without prototypes based on the seL4 microkernel, we implemented our framework following
an HVAC control scenario. Through experiment and analysis we show that the proposed framework
is effective in thwarting attack propagation and minimizing impacts of security breaches. Finally,
we experimentally showed that our framework can have minimal network performance impact.
8.1 Future Work
The key agreement problem is a remaining issue for cryptographic solutions in building au-
tomation systems. Bootstrapping all the tunnels among the proxy applications is a non-trivial
task and has potential for replay attacks, key-leakage, or weakness to compromise. Because of
the heterogeneity of constraints, stakeholders, protocols, and systems involved with deploying and
initializing building automation, we see this key-agreement problem as part of a larger issue. In
the past, network protocol standards have attempted to provide security mechanisms; however,
these security standards have taken much criticism [55], and it is unclear to us if modern systems
are using the security standards at all. As pointed out by Granzer, Kastner, and Praus these
protocols lack mechanisms to distribute and generate keys in a way that can meaningfully solve the
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key-agreement problem. They discuss how BACnet standard’s security architecture devolves this
non-trivial problem to “local matters,” and KNX has no solution either. Granzer, Kastner, and
Praus have an interesting solution for KNX/EIB; however, we feel that additional work is needed.
Some building protocols heavily rely on broadcast traffic. For exmaple, BACnet traffic can
consist of a large share of broadcast packets, and commonly uses BACnet/IP Broadcast Manage-
ment Devices (BBMDs) in practice. While our framework could potentially handle this traffic with
broadcast proxies, we see the network security of this traffic as a remaining problem to be solved.
We hypothesize that digital signature based authentication will work for this traffic, and we are
beginning to experiment in this area.
To bring this prototype into the field, we anticipate that a few remaining problems must
be solved. For many reasons, legacy applications often cannot always be ported to new operating
systems. These applications could be virtualized on top of a microkernel (or microvisor) with newer
applications implemented on the bare microkernel. Some work has been done to show that this
approach may work for less demanding real-time applications [56]. We are currently exploring ways
to progressively integrate with virtualized legacy applications with promising results.
Another challenge is the process of designing and configuring all the needed lightweight proxy
processes in BAN. With large distributed systems this means that developers must configure nu-
merous proxy processes. The clear solution, is to automate or generate and configure the proxy
code for both security and efficiency considerations. We imagine that this proxy code generation
could go hand-in-hand with the configuration framework for the IPC policy.
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